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ABSTRACT 
 
The proliferation of smart phones across the globe, development of 4G network 
standards and its progressing implementation along with shift towards cloud 
computing bring risks to smart phone users who avail of these service. Security of 
cloud storage mobile applications should be essential to smart phone users. 
Enterprises’ move to huge data centres and availing of their infrastructure, platform 
and service is an advantage but poses a risk. Users use corporate resources managed 
and administered with security in mind of policy makers but it is still possible to use 
unsecure, designed for users services without business being aware of it. 
 
This research aims to analyse concerns of data storage providers and services they 
provide on smart phone devices in the form of mobile cloud applications. The 
investigation of data stored on smart phones upon simulation of real life test case 
scenarios will be undertaken. Data recovered from smart phones using mobile cloud 
applications using forensic tools will be examined for any artefacts that may lead to the 
discovery of any security vulnerabilities. This will lead to the formulation of 
conclusions. 
 
Recommendations for future research and work as well as suggestions for users and 
cloud storage vendors will supplement this study in order to increase security of data 
used by smart phone users and their mobile devices as gateways to gain access to this 
data.  
 
 
Key words: cloud storage, mobile application, security, forensics software 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Very often smart phones users, regardless if they are corporate users or consumers, do 
not consider the important issues concerning security of their devices.  In majority, 
they are focused on usability of their device and applications installed on them.  They 
are not aware of terms and conditions of applications they use, mostly by their own 
choice, as well as how these applications operate in the background, which for non-
technical users may prove to be cumbersome.  Users are not concerned if they actually 
own data they upload to the cloud storage , where exactly it is stored, how secure it is, 
what details the provider of an application is collecting to name a few. 
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
Global rapid growth of smart phone users (Statista, 2014) which has seen growth from 
40 million smart phone user globally in first quarter of 2009 to nearly 250 million 
users in third quarter 2013 along with proliferation of cloud storage services (Gartner, 
2013) which allow user to store data elsewhere rather than on their devices brings up a 
challenges and concerns. Providers must guarantee data integrity and availability at all 
times. On the other hand users need to be aware of the cost of data usage and most 
importantly how secure their data is. 
 
All cloud storage providers have security measures in place in their environment 
whether servers are hosted by them or third party data centres. However, how secure 
are mobile applications and data related to operation of these applications on users’ 
mobile devices. If cloud storage data is not properly secured this may lead to an 
individual accessing the data and potentially compromising users’ cloud storage. 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate security implications of using Dropbox, Box 
and SugarSync cloud-based storage applications on smart phones running Apple’s iOS 
and Android operating system. 
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1.2 Introduction 
 
On 29
th
 June 2007 the first iPhone was released (Apple, 2007). The phone was able to 
run third party applications based on Web 2.0 framework. Over a year later on 11
th
 
July 2008 iPhone 3G was released that allowed users to connect with internet over 
mobile phone connections (Apple, 2008). iPhone 3G came preloaded with App Store. 
This is when the revolution in mobile phones started and changed the design, interface 
and users’ interaction with mobile devices irrevocably. iPhone has not been the first 
touchscreen device or the device that was able to run application that comes with 
operating system (Buxton, 2014). However, it was the first device with revolutionary 
touch interface and its own application store. This framework triggered a huge increase 
in development of the third party applications on the iPhone. By March 2008 Apple’s 
software development kit (SDK) has been downloaded 100,000 times and three 
months later the number of SDK downloads reached 250,000. In April 2009 there were 
100,000 applications available on App Store.  Within next few years these numbers 
increased algorithmically. On 22 October 2013 Tim Cook informed that there were 
over 1,000,000 applications available on the App store with over 60 billion downloads 
since the App store has been made available to users.   
Similarly to Apple’s path, Android platform has been developed and made 3rd party 
applications available to users. First branded smart phone with Android operating 
system was launched on 24 January 2008 (Ricker, 2008). It was HTC Dream. Since 
then, market share of Android Operating System (OS) based devices has been 
increasing to become the world’s most popular smart phone operating system (IDC, 
2014). Android operating system in comparison to Apple’s Operating System (iOS) is 
open source software and a number of manufacturers release their smart phones with 
Android OS such as HTC, LG, Samsung or Sony. Smart phones became personal 
mobile computers through which information and resources can be accessed on the go 
at any given moment and anywhere. 
 
The other aspect along with proliferation of smart phone devices is cloud computing, 
in particular cloud storage services. Providers like Dropbox, Box, SugarSync, Google 
or Microsoft to name a few allow consumers to use their servers to store data with 
assurance of data availability, integrity and back-up functionality. Initially service 
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provided to consumers, it expanded to corporate users in the same shape and format as 
for consumers. Now, there are options for businesses to set up business accounts with 
premium service and support on them. These services find their way on to smart 
phones and tackle the storage limitation of devices. Provide back-up of data and allow 
to instantly sharing content. All of this seems to bring benefits to consumers and 
business users alike. 
 
1.3 Background 
 
Software development kits are available for both platforms and virtually any one can 
develop an application. Developers need to adhere to guidelines available on Android 
and Apple developer websites (Apple Developer, 2014; Android Developer, 2014). 
This is where issues may arise. Security and a proper vetting process of third party 
applications is a serious problem. The number of malware available on both App Store 
and Google Play is considerably high with some pointing at Android platform as being 
a leader (Svajcer, 2012). Even though, publication of applications on Android and iOS 
platforms undergo a vetting process it may be not good enough (Biswas, 2012). It does 
not address potential bugs in the software or what and how user’s information relative 
to the application itself is stored i.e. logon details, password and any other relevant 
data. 
 
1.4 Intellectual challenge 
 
The intellectual challenges involved are detailed review of operating systems of two 
major providers of mobile operating platforms, familiarisation with forensic software 
and data acquisition in particular. Also study of cloud computing and cloud storage 
platforms that products were used this research. Finally, detailed analysis of data 
extracted from mobile devices and conclusions leading to recommendations and 
guidance on future research. 
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1.5 Research objectives 
 
The following objectives have been set out to complete the dissertation and contribute 
to the overall outcome. 
 Uncover any potential security flaws when using cloud storage applications 
on a mobile device. 
 Extraction of data using forensic software. 
 Detailed analysis of cloud storage files structure and hierarchy. 
 Preparation of data set consisting of a number files that will be uploaded to 
cloud storage. 
 Simulation of real life transaction of data stored in the cloud. 
 Development of number of test cases to simulate real life scenarios. 
 Detailed review of the forensic software tools. 
 Install of the forensic software products and familiarisation with them. 
 Thorough literature review. 
 Recommendation of a solution to avoid any security flaws. 
 
1.6 Research methodology 
 
The primary research will focus on the analysis of extracted data from cloud storage 
applications installed and used on smart phones. 
 
The secondary research, a follow up experimentation will be carried out in case there 
are findings that may lead to compromising user’s account or data stored in the cloud. 
 
1.7 Resources 
 
Successful completion of the research requires a number of resources. The following is 
the list of the resources that will be utilised during the course of conducting the 
research project. 
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 Laptop computer for conducting the data acquisition, data set uploads and 
writing the dissertation. 
 Smart phones for conducting file transactions and data acquisition. 
 Forensic software products. 
 Internet access. 
 Access to DIT library to enable use of a variety of academic resources. 
 
1.8 Scope and limitations  
 
This study aims to identify security flaws of three different cloud storage smart phone 
applications used to upload, download, view and remove data stored in the cloud. It 
will be carried out by using smart phones to simulate real life usage of both, mobile 
devices and mobile application. Subsequently, forensic tools will be used to acquire 
file system off these smart phones and analysis of that data. There will be experiment 
expectations set out so that outcomes of the research can be referred to as well as to 
previous researches in this field. 
 
Limitations may be down to forensic software tools made available to the researcher as 
well as the feature set and level of data acquisition that these tools will provide. 
 
1.9 Organisation of the dissertation  
 
Chapter 2 introduces the term of cloud computing and cloud storage. It also highlights 
vendor of the cloud storage service used for the purpose of this paper with 
characteristics particular to security measurets implemented by these vendors. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on operating system of one of the most popular mobile operating 
systems provider on the market.  A brief history is presented including major 
achievements in development of these operating platforms. Description of the behind 
the scene of mobile systems as well as their security features. 
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Examination of classification of forensic software tools is provided in Chapter 4. It 
also contains a description of forensic software products made available to the 
researcher. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on previous research.  A review of work so far completed is 
conducted including highlights and critical review. 
 
The experimentation and evaluation of test cases take places in Chapter 6. Detailed 
description of test cases, data set prepared, undertaken scenarios, forensic software 
tools installation process and versions description is achieved. Also, if required, any 
follow up experimentation will be carried out during experimentation and evaluation 
stage. 
 
The entirety of this study is discussed and overall recommendations are concluded in 
last chapter. This will propose the contribution this project offers to both users and 
vendors of cloud storage solutions.  Suggestions are proposed for future work and 
research in the field. 
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2 SECURITY OF CLOUD STORAGE PROVIDERS 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Cloud computing as a term became widely known and used in recent years. However, 
the roots of the concept go back to the sixties. J.C.R. Licklider, the man behind 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), came up with an idea of 
an “intergalactic computer network” in 1969 (Kandukuri., 2009). The term “cloud 
computing” itself was coined in the mid nineties’ by two Compaq staff members, 
market executive named George Favaloro and technologist Sean O’Sullivan 
(Regalado, 2011). Throughout the years, the evolution of cloud computing as a 
network-based service developed from application service provision to the following 
three main areas; 
 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS).  
  Cloud storage is part of an Infrastructure as a Service. 
 
The establishment of Salesforce in 1999, a provider of web-based applications, was 
one of first milestones in the area of cloud computing (Salesforce, 2014). Nowadays, 
huge multinational corporations provide their services in a cloud model. Google, 
Amazon, HP, IBM are a few of the companies who have their data centres located 
across the world (Google, 2014; Amazon; 2014). 
 
Latest IHS Technology forecast showed that businesses will triple their investment in 
cloud-based services between 2011 and 2017 (IHS, 2014). The industry spend in 2011 
was $78.2 billion. In 2013 this amount almost doubled with business spend of $145.2 
billion. This year, it is estimated that the will be total of $174.2 billion invested in 
cloud-based services. It is forecasted that in 2017 enterprise spending will reach 
$235.1 billion as seen in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Global spending forecast on cloud computing (IHS, 2014) 
 
Also Gartner, Inc. predicted an increase in cloud-based services provisioning (Gartner, 
2013). They forecasted that a bulk of new IT spend will be investment in cloud 
computing by 2016. In India, cloud computing will generate the annual growth rate of 
33.2% from 2012 to 2017. Software as a Service and Infrastructure as a Service have 
higher projected growth rate of 34.4% and 39.8% respectively. 
 
CompTIA’s 4th Annual Trends in Cloud Computing Report showed an increase in 
outsourcing of businesses IT systems in the United States (CompTIA, 2013). Main IT 
processes that were moved to cloud are storage (59%), business continuity/disaster 
recovery (48%) and security (44%). In 2012 and 2013 10% of companies were using 
some sort of cloud-based systems as depicted in figure 2.2. 1-30% of IT systems were 
outsourced at the level of 44% in 2012 and this percentage dropped to 31% in 2013. 
However, increase was seen between 2012 and 2013 from 29% to 38% for companies 
with 31-60% cloud-based IT systems and for companies with 61-100% IT systems 
outsourced, increase from 16% to 22% respectively.  
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Figure 2.2 Increase in outsourcing of IT systems to the cloud (CompTIA, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Current and planned use of IaaS/PaaS in industry (CompTIA, 2013) 
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As seen in figure 2.3, there were overall 48% of industry using Infrastructure as a 
Service and Platform as a Service with 36% of businesses being small firms (1-99 
employees), 57% medium firms (100-499 employees) and 53% large firms (500+ 
employees). 29% of industry planned to move to IaaS and PaaS in 2014. This number 
consisted of 29% small firms, 27% medium firms and 33% large firms. 
 
Consumer market for personal cloud storage was on the rise as well (IHS, 2012). The 
ISH iSuppli Mobile and Wireless Communication Service report published in 2012 
showed number of personal cloud storage subscribers in 2011 to be less than 300 
million with projected growth to 500 million users by the end of 2012. Furthermore, 
IHS forecasted steady growth of 25% in subscriptions until at least 2017, 1.3 billion. 
 
More optimistic forecast was released at the end of 2013 by ABI Research that 
forecasted a growth of personal cloud storage subscription to 1 billion in 2013 (ABI 
Research, 2013). 
 
This chapter will discuss the security of three cloud storage providers, whose services 
were used in this research. Also a review of known security breaches for Dropbox, 
Box and SugarSync is presented.  
 
2.2 Dropbox 
 
Two MIT students, Drew Houston and Arash Ferdowsi, founded Dropbox in June 
2007 and launched their product in September 2008 (Dropbox, 2014). 
 
According to the Dropbox official website (Dropbox, 2014) there are more than two 
hundred million users in over two hundred countries uploading one billion files every 
twenty four hours (Dropbox, 2014). Dropbox provides storage services to 4 million 
businesses of which 97% are in Fortune 500. 
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2.2.1  Security of Dropbox service  
 
The following services are elementary to Dropbox architecture which diagram is 
presented in figure 2.4 (Dropbox, 2014). 
 Encryption and application service. 
Uploaded files are being split into blocks which are encrypted using a 
strong cipher. Only blocks that have been modified are synchronised. A 
new file or existing file that has been modified is identified by Dropbox 
application and information is sent to the encryption and application 
service. Service is responsible for new or changed blocks processing and 
transfer of these to the storage service. 
Encryption 
o Data in rest. 
Data stored on Dropbox servers is encrypted using 256-bit Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES). Files split into blocks are stored in 
multiple data centres. 
o Data in transit. 
Data is transferred using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transfer Layer 
Security (TLS). This secure tunnel is protected by 128-bit or higher 
AES encryption. SSL/TLS encryption is in place every time data is 
transferred between a Dropbox client. The client type can be a 
desktop client, mobile client, application programming interface 
(API) or web client, and hosted service. Desktop and mobile as well 
as modern browsers are end points under control of Dropbox. For 
these end points Dropbox uses strong ciphers and support perfect 
forward secrecy. An extra security measure on the web is flagging all 
authentication cookies as secure and enable HTTP Strict Transport 
Security (HSTS). 
Dropbox front-end servers are authenticated through public 
certificates held by the client in order to prevent man-in-the-middle 
attacks. Secure transfer of data to Dropbox front-end servers for both 
file block and metadata storage is achieved by previously negotiated 
encrypted connection. 
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o Key management. 
There are operational, technical and procedural security controls in 
place. Direct access to keys is very limited and their management is 
undertaken by Dropbox on behalf of users. This ensures strong 
cipher encryption, enables advanced features of the product and 
reduces complexity. 
o Data centres. 
Dropbox uses third-party organisation data centres and managed 
service providers. The physical, environmental and operational 
security controls of Dropbox infrastructure lies within third party 
service and storage provider. Dropbox looks after the logical, 
network and application security of the infrastructure hosted at third-
party data centres. Third-party housed infrastructure for Dropbox is 
audited and reviewed at least once a year. Logical and network 
security is protected by firewall configured to a default deny-all 
mode. Furthermore, access restriction to the environment is limited 
to a number of IP addresses and employees. 
 Storage service. 
Users’ content is stored in encrypted blocks. Dropbox client fragments files 
into blocks to prepare for the block storage utility. Each encrypted file 
block is recovered based on its hash value from a Content-Addressable 
Storage (CAS) system. Strong cipher is used to encrypt data at rest. 
 Metadata service. 
Metadata, specific to user, basic information including file names and 
types, is stored in its own storage service. It is indexed data for users’ 
accounts. Dropbox metadata is kept in a MySQL database utility. In order 
to provide best user experience at performance and high availability level, 
metadata is shared and replicated. 
 Notification service. 
This dedicated service is responsible for monitoring of any changes applied 
to Dropbox accounts. Connections to these specific services are not 
encrypted since there are no files or metadata stored here or transferred. A 
long poll connection to the notification service is established with each 
client.  
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The long poll connection is described in XEP-0124: Bidirectional-streams 
Over Synchronous HTTP (BOSH) draft standard (Moffit et al., 2010). The 
standard describes a use of long polling with multiple synchronous HTTP 
request/response pairs to achieve efficiency and low latency.  
The long poll connection is idle until a change to any file in Dropbox 
occurs. In this instance, the notification service beacons an alteration to the 
related client by terminating the long poll connection. Termination of the 
connection indicates that client must connect to the metadata service 
securely to synchronise any changes. 
 Dropbox certification. 
Dropbox storage is SSAE16/SOC1, SOC2, ISAE 3402 and ISO 27001 
certified in Amazon S3 facilities. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Dropbox Architecture (Dropbox, 2014) 
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Model of various instances of the information distributed across these services not only 
improves speed of synchronisation process but makes it more consistent. It also 
enhances security of service. 
 
Dropbox continuously performs automated and manual application security audits and 
testing to address any potential security vulnerabilities and bugs. Security and safety of 
the service is a common work of third party security specialists, industry security 
teams as well as the security research communities. 
 
2.2.2  Dropbox user interfaces 
 
There are three user interfaces that customers may utilise. All of them have security 
features and settings that protect users’ data throughout process of users’ interaction 
with the service (Dropbox, 2014). 
 Web-based application. 
Upload, download, view and file share takes place via modern browsers. 
 Desktop application. 
Dropbox desktop application is a powerful client that allows 
synchronisation of files stored locally for offline access. Users have full 
access to their Dropbox accounts. Clients can run on Mac, Linux and 
Windows operating systems. 
 Mobile application. 
Dropbox synchronisation application is available for iOS, Android and 
Blackberry platforms.  Users can access their files on the go as well as 
download files for offline access to their smart phones or tablets. 
 
2.2.3  Dropbox security breaches  
 
On 19 June 2011 a bug affected authentication mechanism allowing users to log in to 
their accounts with any password (Ferdowsi, 2011). Anyone knowing usernames of 
other Dropbox users could access their cloud storage for duration of almost four hours. 
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On 31 July 2012 Dropbox announced (Agarwal, 2012) that as a result of a hacked 
employee account, a number of email addresses were stolen and used for spam 
purposes. After this incident Dropbox introduced new security measures as follows. 
 Two-factor authentication. Optional requirement to validate users’ login 
details using two proofs; password and a temporary code sent to users’ 
smart phones. 
 Mechanisms to assist with identification of suspicious activities. 
 A new page allowing users to track all active logins (figure 2.5). 
 If users’ passwords are considered to be common, Dropbox may require 
users to change them. 
 
On 13 August 2013 at Usenix 2013 Workshop (Kholia and Wegrzyn, 2013) two 
developers claimed that they were able to hack Dropbox users’ accounts via reverse 
engineering.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Security audit page for Dropbox user (Dropbox, 2014) 
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2.3 Box 
 
Box was founded in 2005 by Aaron Levie, student at University of Southern California 
and Dylan Smith, student at Duke University (Box, 2014). 
 
According to the latest Box announcement (Haig, 2014), there are 25 million active 
Box subscribers and one hundred thousand businesses of which 92% are in Fortune 
500. 
 
2.3.1  Security of Box service  
 
The following are security measures implemented in Box service (Box, 2014). 
 Encryption 
o Data in transit. 
Business and Enterprise accounts are encrypted using 256-bit AES 
SSL encryption. Enterprise accounts benefit of multiple Content 
Delivery Networks (CDNs) such as Akamai (Akamai, 2014) or 
EdgeCast (EdgeCast, 2014) to increase upload speed from distributed 
locations. Once a file is being uploaded or downloaded an encrypted 
SSL tunnel is opened to a local CDN point. CDN then sends the 
encrypted data to the Box servers. This utilises the high bandwidth 
and TCP optimisation processes provided by CDNs for a better 
transfer performance. 
o Data at rest. 
Enterprise account owners benefit from 256-bit AES encryption.  
o Key management. 
A Key Encryption Key (KEK) is used to encrypt the AES encryption 
key. The key encryption key is stored in a secure fashion and 
independently from data as well as rotated frequently to meet the best 
practises for key management. Logs and audits are in place for all 
access to keys. 
o Data centres. 
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Data resiliency is assured by data replication to offsite storage. The 
encryption of the data is retained. The encryption key required to 
decrypt the data is not replicated to redundant storage. 
 Box industry certification. 
o Box fulfils Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No.70 
requirements for both, third party data centre housing their 
infrastructure and the Box company itself. Current certification that 
Box holds is SAS 70 Type II. 
o Box is ISO 27001 complaint (Shirk, 2013) and Safe Harbor certified 
(Safeharbor, 2009). 
 Security within a company. 
There are a number of measures in order to assure security of the services 
provided by Box within a company’s environment. 
o Background checks of employees. 
o Access privileges. 
o Security training. 
o Network and host intrusion detection. 
o Vulnerability monitoring. 
o Audit and log of systems, networks and applications. 
o Third party network security testing. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows Box network architecture and link between end user and cloud 
storage. 
 
Figure 2.6 Box infrastructure (Box, 2014) 
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Users can interact with Box cloud storage service in the same manner as Dropbox 
users. 
 Web-based application. 
Upload, download, view and file share takes place via modern browsers. 
 Desktop application. 
Box desktop application is a powerful client that allows synchronisation of 
files stored locally for offline access. Users have full access to their Box 
accounts. Client can run on Mac and Windows operating systems. 
 Mobile device application. 
Box synchronisation application is available for iOS, Android and 
Blackberry platforms. Users can access their files on the go as well as 
download files for offline access to their smart phones or tablets. 
 
There are no known security breaches to the Box network or hosted data centres. 
 
2.4 SugarSync 
 
SugarSync was founded in 2008 (SugarSync, 2014). The company, formerly known as 
Sharpcast and established in 2004 (Venture Beat, 2009), provides paid-only cloud 
storage services unlike Dropbox and Box. According to SugarSync website 
(SugarSync, 2014), the company has millions of users worldwide. In December 2013 
SugarSync announced (SugarSync, 2013) to move to paid-only model unlike its 
competitors who offer limited storage free of charge. 
 
2.4.1  Security of SugarSync service 
 
A simplified architecture diagram of SugarSync service is shown in figure 2.7.  The 
following are security features of SugarSync service (SugarSync, 2014). 
 
The following are features of SugarSync encryption. 
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 Data in transit. 
Transfer of files is secured using TLS/SSL encryption. 
 Data at rest. 
Stored files are encrypted with 256-bit AES encryption. Data is replicated 
so that users’ files are backed-up. 
 Data Centres. 
SugarSync hosted services are provided by Amazon’s S3 facilities. 
 Data access. 
Access to users’ data is limited to a few employees in SugarSync’s 
escalation team. All personal data access is logged and audited. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Simplified SugarSync architecture (SugarSync, 2014) 
 
Users can interact with SugarSync cloud storage service in the same manner as 
Dropbox and Box users. 
 Web-based application. 
Upload, download, view and file share takes place via modern browsers. 
 Desktop application. 
SugarSync desktop application is a powerful client that allows 
synchronisation of files stored locally for offline access. Users have full 
access to their SugarSync accounts. Client can run on Mac and Windows 
operating systems. 
 Mobile device application. 
SugarSync synchronisation application is available for iOS, Android and 
Blackberry platforms.  Users can access their files on the go as well as 
download files for offline access to their smart phones or tablets. 
 
There are no known security breaches to SugarSync service and servers. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlines cloud storage origins and discusses security frameworks of three 
cloud storage providers that services were used in this research. The reason to choose 
these three providers is that outcomes of the experimentation will be referred and 
checked against previous research.  Also all of the companies share similar origins and 
their founders had the same idea when companies have been established. Provision of 
cloud storage for all three businesses was their sole goal at the time. Dropbox and Box 
provide their cloud storage services to majority of Fortune 500 companies, 97% and 
92% respectively.  SugarSync was the first out of these three to have a presence on the 
market. 
 
Focus of the next chapter will be operating systems of smart phone devices on which 
cloud storage applications will be installed and tested.  The security of the operating 
system will be discussed as well as it is essential to users and providers alike. Users 
want it to be secure since it is their data that is stored in the cloud. Providers want to 
ensure security of their services in this highly competitive market. 
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3 IPHONE OPERATING SYSTEM 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Every operating system whether it is for a PC, laptop, tablet or smart phone has come a 
long way since its initial debut. Since the dawn of smart phones, they are under 
constant scrutiny and are the target of hackers that wish to exploit any security flaw 
that is possible. George Holtz was the first hacker to hack the iPhone (Lee, 2007). 
Apple had exclusive agreement with AT&T for iPhone sales; hence iPhone was locked 
to AT&T network.  Holtz unlocked iPhone so that smart phone could be used on any 
network. 
 
"It's a cat-and-mouse game. We try to stay ahead.  
People will try to break in, and it's our job to stop them breaking in." 
(Steve Jobs) 
 
The first Android phone was released in 2008 (Ricker, 2008) and it was HTC Dream. 
Android operating system based phones were not in demand as depicted in table 3.1 
(Gartner, 2009) thus they were not target of hackers. BlackBerry phones were widely 
used in the industry as they are famous for their security standards and still are. The 
company founded in Canada is the first one to secure United States Department of 
Defence device management approval (Whittaker, 2013). Nokia, market leader at the 
time as seen in table 3.2 haven’t had a smart phone in their offering that would 
resemble iPhone. 
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Table 3.1 Smartphone Sales to End Users by Operating System, 4Q 2008 (Gartner, 2009) 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Smartphone Sales to End Users by Vendor, 4Q 2008 (Gartner, 2009) 
 
 
Each new release of iPhone brought a new set of features, upgraded iOS and potential 
exploits for discovery by hackers. Nowadays, iPhone as well as smart phones 
manufactured by Samsung, HTC, LG or Sony that operate on Android OS are in the 
centre of hackers’ interest as they both combined have majority of smart phone 
operating systems market share. IDC report for 2013 (IDC, 2014) shows that total 
market share of iOS and Android OS devices in 2013 was at 93.8% as depicted in table 
3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Top Five Smartphone Operating Systems, Shipments and Market Share, 2013 
(IDC, 2014) 
  
The focus of this chapter is Android and Apple operating systems for smart phones and 
their security.  
 
3.2 Apple’s iOS  
3.2.1  History of iPhone Operating System  
 
The first iPhone was released in 2007 was supplied with OS X operating system (Web 
Archive, 2014). It has a few applications; some of them were standard to any mobile as 
follows (Morrissey and Campbell, 2010).  
 SMS. 
 Calendar.  
 Photos. 
 Camera. 
 Notes. 
 Clock. 
 Calculator. 
 Settings. 
   33 
 Phone 
 Mail. 
  Some of the applications were not standard ones. 
 YouTube 
 Stocks. 
 Weather. 
 Maps. 
 iTunes. 
 iPod. 
 Safari. 
  Initially application were web based applications that could be downloaded from 
Apple or set up as bookmarks for Safari web browser. 
 
On 11 July 2008 Apple released iPhone 3G along with iPhone 2.0 software 2 (Apple, 
2008).  This OS upgrade brought new features. There were two major additions to 
operating system. The first one was App Store that allowed users to download 
applications for iPhone. The second one was GPS functionality which allowed 
numerous applications to use GPS API to geo-tag files such as photos. Apart from 
these two applications there were few more that are worth listing. 
 Microsoft Exchange support. 
 Push email. 
 The capability to view Microsoft Word documents. 
 Exif data which is held when images are emailed from the device. 
 
On 8 June 2009 Apple released iPhone 3GS with the new iPhone OS 3.0 (Apple, 
2009). It was another major update with a number of extra features. 
 Cut, copy and paste. 
 YouTube account owners were able to sign in. 
 Call history with detailed logs. 
 Video capture (iPhone 3GS only). 
 Addition of thumbnails of the original photos. 
 Autofocus function in the camera (iPhone 3GS only). 
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 Use of MobileMe to enable Find My iPhone option. This allowed users to 
remotely send a message to the device, add a passcode or wipe it. 
 CalDAV support. 
o Standard for accessing, managing and sharing calendar and schedule 
data based on iCalendar format (tools.ietf.org, 2007). 
 LDAV support. 
o Lightweight Directory Access Protocol provides access to distributed 
directory services compliant with X.500 data and service models 
(tools.ietf.org, 2006). 
 Spotlight search. 
 Tethering. 
 Voice memos. 
 Encrypted backups. 
 Hardware encryption (iPhone 3GS only). 
 Voice control. 
 Fraud protection in Safari web browser. 
 Improved Exchange support. 
 Push notifications. 
 
On 8 April 2010 Apple released new iPhone OS 4. Later that year Apple released 
iPhone 4 and “iPhone OS” was rebranded to “iOS” (Apple, 2010). This OS upgrade 
was the most significant so far. The following are the features. 
 VoIP. 
 Switching between applications. 
 Multitasking. 
 Folders. 
 Personalisation of home and lock screen wallpapers. 
 Improved email support. 
o Multiple Exchange accounts. 
o A unified mailbox. 
o Switching between mailboxes was quick. 
o Multiple applications were supporting attachments. 
 iBooks – Apple’s .pdf reader. 
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 Enterprise support. 
o PIN set email encryption. 
o Mobile device management. 
o Wireless applications distribution. 
o SSL VPN feature. 
 Spell checking. 
 Wireless Bluetooth keyboard support. 
 
On 4 October 2011 Apple launched iPhone 4S powered by iOS 5 (Apple, 2011). This 
OS upgrade came with the following notable features. 
 Siri, multiple application voice assistant. 
 iCloud, free up to 5GB Apple cloud storage service. 
 Notification Centre, centralised manager for applications notifications. 
 iMessage, service for sending messages, photos and videos between iOS 5 
users. 
 Newsstand, magazine and newspaper subscription centre. 
 Built-on Twitter integration. 
 HD camera. 
 Over-the-air activation of the device and software updates. 
 
On 12 September 2012 Apple announced iPhone 5 with iOS 6 (Apple, 2012). Handset 
has been redesigned; it was thinner, lighter and was supplied with bigger screen. 
Operating system traditionally came with a set of new features. 
 New maps application, google maps application was removed from the 
operating system. 
 Enhanced Siri features that include applications like Facebook, Twitter or 
ability to launch an application. 
 Built-in Facebook integration. 
 Passbook application for boarding passes, tickets, coupons, loyalty cards. 
 Guided Access, allows users to limit what applications and even further 
what parts of display a user can access. 
 FaceTime calls support over mobile networks. 
 VIP mailbox that stores emails from user preferred contacts. 
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 Do Not Disturb option. 
 Quick message when declining an incoming call and call back reminder. 
 
On 20 September 2013 Apple released iPhone 5S and iPhone 5C models with 
completely redesigned iOS 7 (Apple, 2013). The latest operating system for Apple 
mobile devices family introduced utilisation of 64-bit kernel, libraries and drivers. 
Native applications have been re-engineered for 64-bit in order to take full advantage 
of this architecture. New OS brought the following new features. 
 Control Centre, quick access to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Airplane and Do Not 
Disturb switches as well as music player, clock, calculator and native 
flashlight applications. 
 Notification Centre available at lock screen with Today feature, quick 
access daily agenda, weather and traffic. 
 Enhanced Multitasking. 
 AirDrop, content sharing feature with people nearby. 
 Redesigned Photo and Safari applications. 
 Twitter search integration. 
 Wikipedia integration. 
 Within an application Bing web search. 
 iTunes Radio, a free internet radio facility. 
 Activation Lock via Find my iPhone. Activation Lock requires Apple ID 
and password when turning off Find My iPhone, erasing data or re-
activating a device once it was wiped. 
 All new users are able to download iLife and iWork suites for free. These 
suites consist of creativity and productivity applications such as: 
o iPhoto – photo editor. 
o iMovie – video editor. 
o GarageBand – music editor. 
o Pages – Microsoft Word like application. 
o Numbers – Microsoft Excel like application. 
o Keynote – Microsoft Powerpoint like application. 
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3.2.2  Operating System 
 
iPhone operating system is based on OS X and it utilises modified kernel of the Mac 
OS X. Development is based on XCode and Cocoa Touch (Apple Developer, 2014). 
There are four layers to run applications in iOS (Hoog and Strzempka, 2011). 
 Core OS. 
This layer is responsible for access to external accessories, low-level 
networking, management of memory and file system processing. At this 
layer dynamic library creates and manages certificates and is required by 
Keychain services to provide encryption/decryption role for Keychain files. 
 Core services. 
This layer along with Core OS provides the essentials for applications use. 
Low-level data types and file access operations take place at this level 
through C-based interfaces. Security services for data storage and 
cryptographic purposes are used within keychain databases. Core 
Foundation, CFNetwork and SQLite functions are this layer. 
 Media. 
Graphics, audio and video technologies are located at this layer. 
 Cocoa Touch. 
This is the location of technologies mostly using Objective-C which are 
responsible for implementation of the visual interface for applications. 
 
The latest version of iPhone’s operating system is 7.0.4 and was released on 14 
November 2013 (Apple, 2013). 
 
3.2.3  File System and memory 
 
iOS utilises two memory types (Hoog and Strzempka, 2011). There are RAM 
(Random Access Memory) which is a volatile memory and NAND (Iwata et al., 1987) 
chip, a Solid-State Drive which a non-volatile memory. From forensic perspective 
chip-off data extraction has been very difficult due to the hardware-based encryption 
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present on the iPhone (Zdziarski, 2012). NAND has a high density, no mechanical 
moving parts which enhance durability. 
 
The file system used in iOS device was initially Hierarchical File System (Morrissey 
and Campbell, 2010). However, it was enhanced to include Unicode file name 
encoding, bigger block size from 512-byte blocks to 4KB blocks (Hoog and 
Strzempka, 2011). This file system was named HFS Plus. Currently all iOS devices 
use HFSX file system which differs from HFS Plus that it is case sensitive so that two 
file that have the same name but different case can be stored in the memory. 
  
3.2.4  Security of iOS 
 
Apple, as detailed in the iOS security whitepaper, introduced a number of features to 
secure their operating system (Apple, 2014). These features start to operate as soon as 
user powers on the device and are listed below. 
 System Security. 
 Encryption and data protection. 
 Application security. 
 Network security. 
 Internet services. 
 Device controls. 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts various levels of security architecture of iOS platform. Each level 
has its specific role thus its security requirement and security framework for each has 
been individually designed and implemented. Focus of this chapter is on services and 
components that are in use during regular smart phone use along with accompanying 
cloud storage applications. 
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Figure 3.1 Security architecture of iOS (Apple, 2014) 
   
3.2.4.1  System Security  
 
System security consists of the following components. 
 Secure Boot chain.  
Start-up is a staged process of which each stage has its components (Apple, 
2014).  These are bootloaders, kernel, kernel extensions and baseband 
firmware. All of these are cryptographically signed by Apple to guarantee 
integrity and processed only when the chain of trust is successfully verified. 
This component is responsible for validation of iOS and which is designed 
to run only on Apple devices as well as if the lowest level of software has 
not been compromised. 
 System Software Authorisation. 
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New features and identified security flaws are being dealt with in each 
software upgrade for the device.  Furthermore, this component prevents 
installation of older version of iOS so that previous iOS’ vulnerabilities 
cannot be exploited. 
 
3.2.4.2  Encryption and Data Protection 
 
After ensuring that only trusted code and applications run on an iOS device additional 
encryption and data protection supplements secure storage of user data. This feature is 
operational even if other parts of the device were tampered with. 
 Hardware security features. 
A dedicated 256-bit AES crypto engine is built into Direct Memory Access 
path.  The encryption takes place between NAND memory and main 
system memory which does not decrease device’s performance. In an 
addition to AES encryption, SHA-1 is applied in hardware which reduces 
cryptographic burden even more. 
 File data protection. 
Protection is ensured by creation and management of keys. This takes place 
on top of the hardware encryption. Data protection generates a new 256-bit 
key for each file. Subsequently each key is wrapped using NIST AES key 
wrapping standard, RFC 3394 and stored in file’s metadata. 
 Passcode. 
When passcode is set up, iOS enables Data Protection. Passcode relates to 
device Unique Identifier. This means that any brute-force attacks must be 
performed on the device. The encryption keys are iterated many times in 
order to slow down the attacker. A user can set up the device to wipe after 
up to ten incorrect passcode entries attempts. It also applies time delays 
when invalid password is used.     
 Data protection classes. 
Application that creates a file assigns a class to it. Classes have different 
policies that specify when data is accessible.  The following are basic 
classes. 
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o Complete protection. 
o Protected unless open. 
o Protected until first user authentication. 
o No Protection. 
 Keychain data protection. 
This component secures storage of keys and login tokens and other 
sensitive data that applications require. SQLite database is implementation 
of keychain. 
 Keybags. 
Both classes’, file protection and data protection, keys are stored and 
handled by keybags. There are four of keybags present in iOS. 
o System keybag for normal operation of the iOS device. This is the 
only keybag stored on the device. 
o Backup keybag for creation and encryption of the devices’ backups. 
Keybag is set in iTunes and stored on a PC. 
o Escrow keybag that is used for iTunes synchronisation as well as 
Mobile Device Management (MDM). This keybag is stored on a PC 
used for iTunes synchronisation or the MDM server. 
o iCloud backup keybag works on a similar basis as backup keybag. 
 FIPS 140-2. 
The cryptography present in iOS 7 is compliant with United States Federal 
Information Processing Standard  (FIPS) 140-2 level 1. All cryptographic 
processes in Apple applications and third party applications that adhere and 
utilise iOS cryptography modules are validated and considered integral. 
Bluetooth services are outside of this scope. 
 
3.2.4.3  Application Security  
 
Applications are essential to the iOS ecosystem thus they are signed and verified, 
ensured that they cannot run malicious code and are sandboxed to protect user data. All 
of these measures are implemented to provide stability and security of the platform. 
The following components are responsible for application security compliance. 
   42 
 Application code signing. 
All user processes and applications are controlled by iOS kernel. 
Applications must have an Apple-issued certificate signature in order to 
execute code. Apple and third party applications must comply with this. It 
also is part of chain of trust from operating system to applications. 
 Runtime process security. 
Application cannot compromise other applications or the system itself. 
Restriction is in place for all third party applications from accessing files 
stored by other applications or applying changes to the device. This 
prevention mechanism is called sandboxing. 
 Data protection in applications. 
Software development kit for iOS provides a suite of API’s for developers 
to implement data protection. It is available for file and database API’s such 
as CoreData or SQLite. 
 Accessories. 
All accessories made for iOS devices have to be authorised by Apple. 
When connecting to the device they need to respond with an Apple-
provided certificate which is verified by the device. 
 
3.2.4.4  Network Security  
 
Ability to network is essential and iOS support a number of network security protocols 
to enable users to utilise their devices at the highest level. Below is a list of supported 
network mechanism and protocols.  
 SSL, TLS protocols. 
Support for Secure Socket Layer (SSL v3) and Transport Layer Security 
(TLS v1.0, TLS v1.1, TLS v1.2) as well as Datagram TLS is essential in 
iOS. All applications that utilise internet connection automatically use these 
protocols to encrypt communication.  
 VPN. 
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Minimal set up and configuration of iOS device is required for virtual 
private networking. iOS support VPN servers that use variety of protocols 
and authentication mechanisms. 
 Wi-Fi. 
Industry standard Wi-Fi protocols including WPA2 Enterprise are 
supported by iOS. 
 Bluetooth. 
Encryption Mode 3, Security Mode 4 and Service Level 1 Bluetooth type 
connections are supported within iOS.  
 Single Sign-On. 
SSO with Kerberos-based networks is support on iOS devices. This allows 
corporate users to authenticate with enterprise environment. SSO is 
supported by Safari and networking API’s allow developers to utilise this 
mechanism by whitelisting these API’s. 
 AirDrop security. 
AirDrop uses Bluetooth Low-Energy (BTLE) and Apple-created peer-to-
peer Wi-Fi technology to exchange files and data with devices in vicinity. 
While enabling AirDrop, a 2048-bit RSA identity is stored on the device. 
Also AirDrop identity hash based on the user’s Apple ID is created. When 
sharing via AirDrop is used the device sends signal to other devices that 
have AirDrop turned on and are powered on. These devices respond with 
shortened owner’s identity hash. Devices use TLS encrypted connection for 
sharing data. 
 
3.2.4.5  Internet Services  
 
Internet services like iMessage, FaceTime, Siri, iCloud, iCloud Backup and iCLoud 
Keychain have been designed to empower users. They were built with the same aim as 
all other services and components which high security and usability. Secure handling 
of data at rest or in transit, safeguarding of users’ data and protection against malware 
or unauthorised access were in mind of developers of these services.  
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3.2.4.6  Device Controls  
 
Device controls is set of tools that empower businesses who want to use iOS devices 
or have an active Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy in place. By using 
Exchange ActiveSync and MDM, IT security officers can implement set of policies 
that allow to control, monitor and restrict use of certain applications or other services. 
Below is a list of the device controls. 
 Passcode protection. 
 Configuration enforcement. 
o Passcode policies. 
o Device features restrictions such as Siri, iCloud, camera. 
o Wi-Fi settings. 
o VPN settings. 
o Email server profile. 
o Exchange profile. 
o LDAP directory service settings. 
o CalDAV calendar service settings. 
o Web clips. 
o Credentials and keys. 
o Advanced mobile network settings. 
 Mobile Device Management. 
 Apple configurator (available only on OS X device). 
 Device Restrictions. 
 Supervised Only Restrictions (implemented via OS X device) 
 Remote Wipe. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on one of the most popular mobile operating systems. Its history, 
development throughout the years as well as technical details and security features 
were discussed. Although iOS is not so widely used as it used to be, this operating 
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system started the smart phone revolution and its developments and features are still 
used as a blueprint by other mobile operating system providers. 
Next chapter discusses forensic software tools classification as well as tools that were 
made available to the researcher. 
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4 FORENSIC SOFTWARE 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3, operating systems for mobile device of two market leaders were 
discussed. This chapter will focus on forensic methods and forensic software utilised 
in this research. The reason for use of the forensic software listed in this chapter was 
that these software products were made available to the researcher.  
4.2 Classification of Forensic Tools  
 
Sam Brothers came up with a forensic tool classification system (Brothers, 2007) that 
is based on the depth of the level examiner and/or forensic software acquires data of 
the device. Although, author relates his levelling system to iPhone, this system can be 
used for any mobile phone, tablet or GPS device. Software developers of forensic tools 
refer to this classification.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Forensic analysis tools classification (Brothers, 2007) 
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4.2.1  Manual Extraction  
 
Manual extraction of data is performed through interaction with a device. Direct 
examination of the device is based on manual, hand investigation of it. Examiner, as 
long as the device is in a operational condition, can browse through available files on 
the device built-in memory or memory card as well as contacts, calendar, notes, voice 
memos, photographs, videos and files stored by applications. Examination is limited to 
the ecosystem of the device that is available to the owner of the device. 
Software that operates at this level is available from the following sources: 
 ERT available at http://www.fernico.com/ert.htm 
 Project-A-Phone available at http://www.projectaphone.com/ 
 
4.2.2  Logical Extraction  
 
Logical extraction requires a connection between a device and a computer running 
forensic software to acquire data. Connection is usually established with use of data 
cable (USB or serial), Bluetooth or Infrared. Protocols to establish the communication 
vary and a few of them are briefly discussed below. 
 Wireless. 
BREW Binary Runtime Environment for Wireless protocol (Brewmp 
Developer, 2014). BREW has been developed by Qualcomm and is used by 
software programmers to develop portable applications that run on Code 
Division Multiple Access-based handsets (CDMA). 
 Hayes AT Commands (Nemesis Lonestar, 2000). 
This protocol originated as a transmission protocol used to ensure data 
integrity or provide compression between modems. Since then it has been 
developed and expanded and found its use in GSM area. This protocol is 
used for the following actions (Sonymobile, 2010). 
o Develop new communication software. 
o Work with SMS and Contacts. 
o Amend settings on mobile phones. 
o Add a mobile device to a list of supported modems in an application. 
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 F-Bus (Fast bus) 
This is another communication protocol for transferring data. It was widely 
used in low-tier Nokia handsets. 
 
Communication is based on client-server framework. Data is acquired in the following 
manner: 
 Software initiates a command that is sent to a device using established 
connection. 
 Device’s processor receives the command and processes it. 
 Response to the command is compiled. 
 Software receives the response from the device. 
 
Software that acquires data at the logical level: 
 XRY Logical available at http://www.msab.com 
 BlackLight available at http://www.blackbagtech.com 
 CellXTract available at http://www.logicube.com 
 MOBILedit Forensic available at http://www.mobiledit.com 
 Oxygen Forensic available at http://www.oxygen-forensic.com 
 Mobile Phone Examiner available at http://www.accessdata.com 
 Lantern available at http://katanaforensics.com 
 UFED Analyzer available at http://www.cellebrite.com 
 Secure View available at http://mobileforensics.susteen.com 
 EnCase Forensics available at http://www.guidancesoftware.com/ 
 
4.2.3  Physical Extraction  
 
Connection means are the same as in logical extraction level. The difference is that 
boot loader or unsigned code is uploaded into the memory of the phone which results 
in all or almost all date duplicated on to computer hosting the forensic software.  
Replicated data is stored in a raw HEX (binary) format. This method establishes link to 
the diagnostic connection such as JTAG (Corelis, 2013) on the device to acquire data. 
 
   49 
JTAG stands for Joint Test Access Group. This group developed a technique for 
printed circuit boards (PCBs) and integrated circuits (chips or microchips) debugging 
in 1980s. In 1990 JTAG testing was standardised as the IEEE 1149.1-1990 standard 
for reduced-pin and enhanced-functionality test access port and boundary-scan 
architecture (IEEE Standard, 2014). This standard defines built-in circuitry that allows 
test, maintenance and support of PCBs. Its standard interface makes possible for 
instructions and test data communication as well as response from tested object. 
 
The following software operates at the above level: 
 The Zdziarski Method (iOS only) available at http://www.iosresearch.org/ 
 XRY Physical available at http://www.msab.com 
 iXAM (iOS limited to older device models) available at http://www.ixam-
forensics.com/ip_forensics.asp 
 EnCase Forensics (Android OS only) available at 
http://www.guidancesoftware.com/ 
 
4.2.4  Chip-Off Extraction 
 
This technique is based on physical removal and analysis of memory chip also called 
NAND flash. A chip reader connected to the computer is used to read all data stored on 
the chip. Like in the physical extraction duplicated data is in a raw format. The data 
may be encrypted as some devices store data at rest encrypted. 
 
Flash Doctor developed by Salvation Data Technology available at 
http://www.salvationdata.com/ allows examiner for chip-off extraction. 
 
4.2.5  Microread 
 
This methodology is the most time-consuming, the most expensive and requires 
enormous knowledge. Microread is uses an optical character recognition or relies on 
manual read of individual bits from device’s memory. The status of physical gates 
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needs to manually read then translated to binary code which translates to ASCII 
characters. This technique is used only when prior attempts fail or examiner knows 
that chip is faulty. 
 
There is no software for this type of data acquisition commercially available. 
 
4.3 BlackLight 
 
BlackLight® forensic software has been developed by BlackBag™ Technologies, Inc. 
(Blackbagtech, 2014). BlackBag offers software for forensic acquisition and analysis; 
training and certification; eDiscovery, native Mac OS X data processing. It can be used 
a quick triage tool or sophisticated examination tool. 
 
4.3.1  BlackLight features  
 
BlackLight is comprehensive analysis software (Blackbagtech, 2014). It allows the 
examiner to extract and analyse data from Mac OS X, Windows computers including 
registry and iPhone, iPad and iPod devices. 
The following is a list of data that BlackLight software can acquire during examination 
process including search and filter options. 
 Snapshot of user’s device. 
o Device type. 
o iOS/OS version. 
o Serial number. 
o UDID (Unique Device Identifier). 
o IMEI (International Mobile station Equipment Identity). 
o Artefacts summary statistics for documents, emails, videos, calls, 
voicemails and more. 
o User’s device account information and common internet account data 
for social media applications or iCloud. 
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o Recent usage history including list of last running applications, most 
recent web-based location searches and dialled phone numbers with 
associated contact information. 
 Examination of large data sets using file filter option. User can define filter 
settings as follows: 
o File name, kind, size or extension. 
o Date when file was created, modified and accessed. 
o Picture metadata attributes including GPS location and camera type 
(iOS device). 
o Positive and negative hash set. 
 Media filter. Support for media files commonly used along with following 
features: 
o Built-in GPS mapping for files containing geolocation stamp. 
o Proprietary skin tone analysis mechanism. 
o Video frame analysis. 
 Social media activity. 
o Ability to track transaction on the following social media 
applications; Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Foursquare. 
 Messaging filter. 
o Support and view of messaging history in its native form for SMS, 
MMS, Skype, iMessage, iChat, Kik, TextPlus, TextFree. 
 Data analysis. Apart from data listed above, BlackLight has ability to 
demonstrate data from the following areas of iOS device. 
o Phone; all data explicit to iPhone such as recent calls, voicemails, 
voice memos, favourites. 
o Application data; user explicit application files stored within the 
application. 
o Contacts. 
o Locations; chronological list of all GPS data from Google Maps, 
Apple Maps, Foursqaure, Kik, Whatsapp applications as well as data 
from Location Services. 
 Reporting tool. A customisable report that can be saved as .pdf, .html, .docx 
or .txt. 
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 All acquired data can be exported. 
 
4.4 EnCase Forensic  
 
EnCase® Forensic has been developed by Guidance® Software (Guidancesoftware, 
2014). Organisation provides tools for computer investigations including intellectual 
property theft, compliance auditing, incident response and responding to eDiscovery 
requests. 
 
4.4.1  EnCase Forensic features  
 
EnCase Forensic supports a broad array of platforms (Guidancesoftware, 2014); Apple 
iOS (logical acquisition only), RIM BlackBerry, Google Android (logical and physical 
acquisition), Windows Mobile Operating Systems, SIM cards, iTunes and backup files. 
EnCase performs precise binary image of the original media.  
EnCase allows examiner to analyse the following: 
 Origins of the data. 
 Type of user actions that created the data. 
 Time the data was last accessed. 
Also it enables examiner to: 
 Recover files and partitions. 
 Identify deleted files. 
 Analyse file signature. 
 Analyse hash. 
 Examine most common files in their native format. 
 View registry. 
 Search using different techniques. 
o Conditional search. 
o Word search. 
o Boolean search. 
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o GREP search (Globally search a Regular Expression and Print) 
(Kernighan and Pike, 1984). 
 Search across various types of information such as email, system, user-
generated files using three principal methods of search through raw data: 
o Index searches. 
o Tag searches. 
o Keyword searches. 
The searches results are thorough across the three search methods. 
 Acquire user-specific activity including internet use history, cookies, logon 
details and more. 
 Acquire device information, contacts, call history, SMS, MMS, other 
messages, organiser, notes, file system. 
 Create reports that are highly customisable in .rtf, .pdf or .html formats. 
 
4.5 Oxygen Forensic Suite  
 
Oxygen Forensic® has been developed by Oxygen Software (Oxygen-forensic, 2014). 
This company delivers advanced forensic data examination tools for mobile devices. 
Oxygen forensic acquires data from mobile devices operating on Android, iOS, 
BlackBerry, Windows Phone and Symbian platforms and other operating systems such 
as Bada and Chinese Mediatek (MTK) devices. 
 
4.5.1  Oxygen Forensic Suite Standard Edition features  
 
The following data can be acquired and examined with use of Oxygen Forensic Suite 
Standard Edition (Oxygen-forensic, 2014). 
 Device information. 
o Full technical description of a device. 
 Manufacturer. 
 Retail model name. 
 Platform and its revision. 
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 IMEI. 
 MAC addresses. 
 IMSI. 
 Serial Number. 
 Phone number and any other model specific data. 
o Summary of user’s accounts. 
 Contact details from Contacts, Call Logs, Messages, Skype, chat and other 
applications. 
 Call logs, SMS, MMS, iMessage and other messages specific to device 
type.  Also recovery of messages from iOS, Android OS and Symbian OS 
devices. 
 Calendar and tasks entries. 
 File System.  
The investigator can browse through a device’s file system to access and 
examine user’s photographs, videos, documents, device databases and any 
other files stored on the mobile device’s memory. Oxygen Forensic comes 
with built-in text, hex, multimedia, SQLite, Plist viewers, geo-location and 
Exif extractors. 
o Exif is Exchangeable image file format (JEITA, 2002), industry 
standard introduced by Japan Electronics and Information 
Technology Industries Association. This standard is for file formats 
used in images, sounds and tags including geo-location tags in digital 
cameras and other hardware processing image and audio files 
recorded by digital equipment. 
 Reporting tool.  
Highly customisable report can be availed of and generated in .pdf, .xlsx, 
.html, .rtf and .xml file formats. 
 
4.5.2  Oxygen Forensic Suite Analyst Edition features  
 
Oxygen Forensic Suite Analyst Edition provides all features that investigator can avail 
while using Standard Edition extended with features below (Oxygen-forensic, 2014).  
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 Contact details from Contacts, Call Logs, Messages, Skype, chat and other 
messaging, social media and call-feature applications such as Facebook, 
WhatsApp and Viber can be aggregated. 
 Applications. 
Ability to retrieve and list user data and files from pre-installed and user 
applications along with files created by these applications. Investigator 
may: 
o Retrieve logins and passwords to the application. 
o Find geo-location of the last run. 
o Inspect all used and created application files. 
o Know exactly when the application was used. 
o Access system and user applications. 
 Dictionaries. 
This feature allows the examiner to access all words that were ever inputted 
in device messages, notes and calendar. This is user’s dictionary created 
during use of the device by its owner. 
o View of all words inputted by the user. 
o Reveal passwords. 
o Simulate possible phrases. 
o Change language if required. 
o Estimate frequency of word usage. 
o Reveal words order. 
 Global search. 
It is highly customisable search engine that allow investigator look for text, 
phone numbers, emails, geo coordinates, IP addresses, MAC addresses, 
Credit Card numbers. This feature enables to search data in a single device, 
all devices allocated to the case or all acquired devices. Also search can be 
applied by: 
o Query. 
o Boolean term. 
o Any predefined pattern. 
o Keyword list manager, custom list of terms for which search is 
performed simultaneously. 
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 Link and stats. 
This feature allows examining social interactions and connections between 
mobile devices of users under investigation. 
 Passwords.  
Section demonstrates user details acquired from default secure storage such 
as keychain database or applications files. This feature is available for iOS 
and Android devices. 
 Chinese phones support based on Mediatek chipset. 
 Guide to automate Android device rooting for access to all data set. Rooting 
android device gives the following advantages: 
o Access to full file system stored on both built-in memory and 
memory card. 
o Access to application data including logins, passwords, history, 
cache. 
o Information on past geo-location information. 
o Access to removed data in database tables. 
Supported Android operating systems are 1.6-2.3.4 and 3.0-4.2.2. 
 Timeline.  
Investigator can view acquired data in a chronological way. This feature 
works on a single device or multiple devices allocated to a case. 
 Data Viewers is an extension of feature available in Standard Edition. It 
allows exploring actual and removed data stored in databases and other files 
like property files (iOS). 
 Web Connections & Locations. 
 Feature combines data from Wi-Fi connections (SSID, BSSID), IP 
connections (Wi-Fi, GPRS, LTE including VPN, router, DNS data) and 
GPS data with Location services thus maps displaying visited places and 
routes can be created. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed data acquisition methods classification as per “Guidelines on 
Mobile Device Forensics” drafted by Rick Ayers of National Institute of Technology 
of United Stated Department of Commerce, Sam Brothers of United States Customs 
and Border Protection and Wayne Jansen of Booze-Allen-Hamilton (Ayers et al., 
2013).  The majority of the chapter is focused on three forensic software products 
made available to the researcher. Detailed features of each of the tools were listed. All 
of these tools operate at logical level of extraction and all of them offer the same set of 
features in majority. Some of them have extra options like Oxygen’s Global Search, 
Password Recovery or Android Rooting guide. However, for purpose of this research 
the essential requirement for forensic software was acquisition of file system which all 
software products demonstrate. 
 
The following chapter reviews research in this area of smart phone operating systems 
and use of cloud storage applications. 
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5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 detailed network and security architecture of cloud storage providers. Their 
compliance with the highest security standards and the top level of services they 
provide. In Chapter 3 mobile operating platforms were discussed. Both claim their 
systems to be secure and easy to use. This chapter will focus on concerns, advantages 
and previous researches of cloud storage technology and mobile operating systems.  
 
5.2 Mobile Cloud Computing 
 
There are a lot of concerns surrounding the use of mobile cloud computing. First of all, 
performance issues. Smart phones are getting bigger by the size and by the 
computational power.  The trade-off for this is battery life expectation and operational 
memory (Alwan et al. 2013; Hu et al., 2013). Smart phones handle multiple 
applications and some of them or most of them depending on users’ preferences are 
working in real time with high frequency utilising virtual memory or scanning all files. 
These processes affect other processes and users face delay times as a result of RAM 
deficiency or shorter battery life. Another concern is quality and mobile network 
coverage. Although, in urban areas this issue is not so common, there are black holes 
here and there. Or signal may be blocked by high buildings or thickness of the walls. 
In this scenario, users will see latency while accessing network as well as poor battery 
performance due to device increased power supply to aerial system to increase the 
levels of signal reception. To address some of these concerns network operators 
improve their network architecture, install additional signal boosters. On the other 
hand, cloud storage providers attempt to utilise partitioning and offloading techniques 
between client side and server side. The concept of partitioning is to divide the 
workload of applications between mobile device and cloud servers. 
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One of the key concerns is end user device handling. Industry can avail of mobile 
device management platforms but the end user does not have this option. MDMs allow 
enforcement of number of features including security policies such as discussed in 
Chapter 3. However, for end users security of their mobile devices is their own 
responsibility. There are number of security measures that mobile operating systems 
made available to end users and which they can implement (Cummins et al., 2012; 
Ahmad et al., 2013, Olivier and Pieterse, 2013). Depending OS provider features vary 
but there are essential ones that all platforms have in common. These features as well 
as recommendation are as follows. 
 Password protection. 
 Application of system updates which provide security updates. 
 Turning off wireless features such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or portable hotspot 
when not in use. 
 Enable data wipe when incorrect password is entered multiple times. 
 Minimise notifications that appear on the screen while it is locked. 
 Do not root or jail-brake the mobile device. 
 Do not enter and personal information on the mobile device. 
 
 
Security of third party applications installed and used on mobile devices is another 
concern. This was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Research in this area shows the 
importance of application sandboxing and issues with applications vetting process 
(Ahmad et al. 2013). While Apple make efforts to ensure security of their operating 
system and security of applications running on it in a number of ways, Android 
platform is an open source platform (Jeter and Mishra, 2013). Also due to its 
popularity it is more likely to be infiltrated via poorly vetted third party applications. 
 
For the industry the key concern is commercialisation of IT. Bring your own device 
trend that emerged recently (Leavitt, 2013), brings a range of new risks. Android 
mobile device users can root their devices in order to gain administrator privileges and 
install applications from unknown sources. iPhone users can jail-brake theirs for 
mobile phones for the same purpose. Leavitt lists new approaches to security such as 
MDM platforms and Mobile Application Management (MAM) that these platforms 
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provide. MAM tool in other words is an equivalent of App Store or Google Play but 
the advantage for information security officers lies with the fact that it is managed 
internally within the business. This allows setting up corporate application store with 
applications that were evaluated internally. The other advantage of MDM is ability to 
whitelist and blacklist applications so that users will be prevented from using certain 
applications. This can protect the image of the company as some users may access 
applications with sexual or violent content or games. If the company handles highly 
sensitive data, administrators can blacklist applications that store content for their 
users. This addresses cloud computing storage concerns relating to location of the data 
stored, who can access it and in case of any legal disputes, jurisdictional issues. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed key concerns of mobile cloud computing as well as research 
performed so far. It also reviewed techniques and methods to protect corporate 
networks and resources. A list of recommendation for end user was revealed in order 
to promote and increase secure use of smart phones and applications that are installed 
on mobile devices. 
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6 EXPERIMENTATION & EVALUATION 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of the experiment was to evaluate the security level of cloud storage 
applications for smart phone devices based on Apple and Android operating system.  
In order to perform the evaluation forensic software was obtained. The experiment was 
designed to capture a various scenarios that a device’s state can be in to evaluate its 
impact on the date extracted. Also thorough analysis of extracted data was conducted 
in search of artefacts and any other relevant information that may be used to 
compromise user’s cloud storage. 
 
Nowadays, corporate users’ devices are administered and monitored by Mobile Device 
Management platforms such as AirWatch, Mobile Iron or BlackBerry Enterprise 
Servers (Gartner, 2013). These platforms allow administrator forcing of a device 
password protection in order to secure data stored on devices if they are lost or stolen 
(AirWatch, 2014; MobileIron, 2014; BlackBerry 2013). Among a number of tools 
these platforms give to administrators, there are some that relate to secure handling and 
managing of enrolled mobile devices. The ones that are essential are GPS location 
services that give administrators the option to track devices and remote wipe options 
which are either erasure of the entire data on the device (restore to factory settings) or 
removal of enterprise data only. 
 
There are number of scenarios that may lead to a device getting into the hands of 
malicious users or simply an individual unaware what data may be held on a device 
that they have found. In this research a possible scenario is one by which a malicious 
person wants to acquire data from a mobile device user in a way that will allow 
continuous access to user’s data stored in the cloud. 
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6.2 Forensic Software Installation  
6.2.1  BlackLight forensic software installation  
 
BlackBag offers a 30-day trial of their BlackLight software. The demo gives the tester 
a full feature set to avail of during tests. 
 
After application for a demo, an email was received with a URL to the software 
download site as well as license key. Once the software was downloaded and installed 
and started for first time there was an option to plug in a USB dongle or key in Demo 
license key.  After demo license key was entered software was ready to use. 
 
Forensic software version: BlackLight 2013 Release 3. 
 
In this research BlackLight was found to be the most comprehensive software tool 
used. It was fast to acquire data off the smart phone and results were easily readable 
and interpreted. It displayed the file system in a hierarchical way that was easy to 
analyse. The data acquisition lasted a couple of minutes. Further data processing lasted 
around 45 minutes. For data processing the smart phone was not required. 
 
6.2.2  EnCase Forensic software installation  
 
Guidance Software does not offer trials or demos. Instead, they offer heavily 
discounted academic licenses.  
 
Once the purchase was concluded, email with download and installation instruction as 
well as license key was received. The software was downloaded and installed. After 
initial start of the software, tester clicked on upper right dropdown menu and selected 
Activate Electronic License… An Activate Electronic License dialog window opened 
and the license key was inputted along with tester’s email address. In next step a 
License Request file was generated and tester submitted it using link received in the 
email. Another email was sent including License Activation file and further 
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instructions. License Activation file was saved in to the same folder where License 
Request file resided. Then in the EnCase Activation Electronic License dialog window 
tester chose Finish to complete activation process and restarted software. EnCase 
Forensic can be installed on up to three machines. 
 
Forensic software version: EnCase v7.09.03. 
 
EnCase data acquisition was as fast as for BlackLight, Time to process acquired data 
was around 45 minutes as well. However, the analysis of the file structure and artefacts 
was cumbersome and not easy. 
 
6.2.3  Oxygen Forensic software Standard Edition installation  
 
Oxygen Software provides 180 days limited demo on their Oxygen Forensic software. 
 
On application for Oxygen Forensic Suite 2014 (freeware) email with download and 
installation instruction as well as license key and customer ID for support purposes 
was received. Oxygen software was downloaded and installed. On the initial start of 
the software, tester selected Service then Enter Key from the menu. The registration 
form opened and license key was pasted and saved. Oxygen Forensic Suite was 
restarted to apply a new license key. Demo license allows installing software on two 
machines. 
 
Forensic software version: Oxygen Forensic Suite 2014 Standard Edition 6.1.0. 
 
Oxygen Forensic proved to be the least preferred software. It took much longer to 
acquire data so for the test case scenario it would not meet the expectation. Processing 
of acquired data was at the same level as BlackLight and EnCase. The results of 
processing of the evidence and the file structure presented to the researcher were 
similar to the ones provided by BlackLight. 
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6.3 Experimentation 
 
This chapter discusses preparation of data set, test case scenarios including simulation 
of real life use of smart phones and cloud storage applications and files stored in the 
cloud. Test expectations are listed in this chapter and analysis of data acquired with use 
of forensic software tools. 
  
6.3.1  Data Set  
 
A data set has been prepared for use with cloud storage. Data set consisted of twenty 
files. 
 Four word files (.doc and .docx). 
 Four picture files (.jpg). 
 Four Adobe Reader files (.pdf). 
 Four music files (mp3). 
 Four video files, these files were different for Apple device and Android 
device due to compatibility issues i.e. Apple device does not support .3gp 
files and Android device does not support quick time (.mov) files. 
 
Filenames for each cloud storage application and smart phone tested were changed. 
6.3.2  Transactions on files 
 
Cloud storage as a service is utilised in a number of ways. Users use it to back up their 
files, to access them anywhere they are and from any hardware they can use such as 
PC, laptop, smart phone or tablet. They upload, download, edit, share and remove files 
from their cloud storage. For the purpose of this research the following transactions 
were executed on files to simulate real life use of the cloud storage. The order and 
transactions on files acted upon are listed in the table 6.1. The table consist of files 
used for Dropbox cloud storage application installed on iPhone. The naming 
convention reflects cloud storage provider and operating system of a mobile device. 
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File name and type Transaction 
DB_iOS_01.doc File viewed. 
DB_iOS_02.docx File viewed and deleted. 
DB_iOS_03.docx File viewed and saved for offline access. 
DB_iOS_04.docx No action. 
DB_iOS_05.jpg File viewed. 
DB_iOS_06.jpg File viewed and deleted. 
DB_iOS_07.jpg File viewed and saved for offline access. 
DB_iOS_08.jpg No action. 
DB_iOS_09.pdf File viewed. 
DB_iOS_10.pdf File viewed and deleted. 
DB_iOS_11.pdf File viewed and saved for offline access. 
DB_iOS_12.pdf No action. 
DB_iOS_13.mp3 File viewed. 
DB_iOS_14.mp3 File viewed and deleted. 
DB_iOS_15.mp3 File viewed and saved for offline access. 
DB_iOS_16.mp3 No action. 
DB_iOS_17.mov File viewed. 
DB_iOS_18.mov File viewed and deleted. 
DB_iOS_19.mov File viewed and saved for offline access. 
DB_iOS_20.mov No action. 
Table 6.1 File names and file transactions 
 
6.3.3  Smart phone device state  
 
For each device and cloud storage application the following scenarios was determined. 
 First device state. 
Data set has been synchronised with the device and device remains 
powered on. 
 Second device state. 
Data set has been synchronised with the device and device has been 
powered off and on. 
 Third device state. 
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Data set has been synchronised with the device and applications’ cache has 
been cleared. For this test device was previously wiped. 
 Fourth device state. 
Data set has been synchronised with the device, applications’ cache has 
been cleared and device has been powered off and on. For this test device 
was previously wiped. 
 
Due to software limitations for all scenarios device passcode lock has been unlocked or 
not set up. The real life scenario would be when a user leaves their smart phone 
unlocked and unattended or passcode is known to potential malicious individual. 
 
6.3.4  Tests expectations  
 
Each cloud storage application tested against various mobile devices states and 
transactions performed on files was expected to return as follows. 
 Files viewed. 
o Files and thumbnails should be saved in cache of cloud storage 
application.  
o For device with cleared cache, there should be no records of files. 
 Files viewed and deleted. 
o No records of files. 
 Files viewed and saved for online access. 
o Files and thumbnails should be saved in cache of cloud storage 
application.  
o For device with cleared cache, there should be no records of files in 
cache. 
o Files should be saved in respective application in which each file was 
saved (iOS device) or smart phone memory (Android device). 
 No action. 
o No records of files. 
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6.3.5  Analysis of database files for individual cloud storage 
applications  
 
Thorough analysis of SQLite and database files will be performed in order to establish 
what details are stored within the application files by means of manual examination of 
files. 
 
The expected outcome of the analysis is that no information that may be used to 
compromise user’s cloud storage should be found.  This includes user’s email address, 
password or any other detail that directly may give malicious individual access to 
user’s cloud storage. 
 
6.3.6  Hardware and software  
 
The following hardware and software was used to conduct the experiment. 
 
Smart phone operating system was the key driver behind the choice of mobile devices.  
iOS and Android OS have the lion’s share of the market. The researcher himself is 
iPhone user so the choice was to use iPhone 4S for experiments. Simplified technical 
specification of iPhone 4S is included in the table 6.2.  
 
Feature iPhone 4S 
Operating system iOS 7.0.4 
Internal memory 16GB 
Memory card No 
Table 6.2 Smartphone features 
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Cloud storage applications and their versions are listed in table 6.3. 
 
Application iPhone 4S PC Client 
Dropbox 3.0.2 2.4.7 
Box 2.8.7 4.0 (Web based application client) 
SugarSync 4.1.0.1 2.0.42.120603.20131120 
Table 6.3 Cloud storage mobile and PC client versions 
 
Forensic software tools used for the experimentation and their versions are listed in 
table 6.4. 
 
Forensic Tool Version 
BlackLight 2013 (iOS only) Release 3 
EnCase Forensic 7.09.03 
Oxygen Forensic Suite 2014 Standard Edition 6.1.0 
Table 6.4 Forensic software tools and versions 
 
Dell Latitude E4200 laptop with Windows 7 SP1 Enterprise Edition was used to install 
forensic software tools. 
 
6.4 Test Outcomes  
 
The following are the test case results from the defined device. 
 
6.4.1  iOS Applications  
 
All applications installed on the iPhone created their respective folders in 
/private/var/mobile/Applications. Files and applications’ metadata was stored in this 
location. This is stored in user’s partition (Johnson, 2011). 
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6.4.1.1  Dropbox 
 
Data set files saved for offline access were stored within different applications due to 
design of the application itself. The following applications were used in the test. 
 iBooks application used to store .pdf file. 
 Pages application used to store .docx file. 
 iMovie application used to store .mov file. 
 Library used to store .jpg file.  
 iMovie application used to store .mp3 file. 
 
Dropbox application created a folder in user’s partition. Files from data set were 
recovered from /Library/Caches/Dropbox folder and include: 
 Viewed .doc file and viewed and saved for offline access .docx. 
 Thumbnails images of viewed, viewed and saved for offline access and no 
actioned.jpg files. Also a .jpg image file stored for offline access. 
 Viewed, viewed and stored for offline access .pdf files. 
 Viewed (played), viewed and stored for offline access .mp3 file.  
This file was saved in Apple iMovie application. File location was 
/iMovie/Library/Application Support/Documents/SharedMedia/AudioFile.  
 Thumbnail images of all .mov files, apart the one that was removed. Also a 
.mov file saved for offline access. 
This file was saved in Apple iMovie application. File location was 
/iMovie/Library/Application Support/Documents/SharedMedia.  
 
Detailed analysis of Dropbox xml property list file com.getdropbox.Dropbox.plist  
stored in /Library/Preferences folder revealed information on user account name and 
email address used to set the account. It also listed three .pdf file names that were 
viewed on the device. Clearing the cache or powering of the device did not change 
data stored in these files.  
 
Dropbox SQLite metadata repository file Dropbox.sqlite located in /Documents did not 
reveal any interesting findings presented in Appendix A. 
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6.4.1.2  Box 
 
Data set files saved for offline access were stored within different applications due to 
design of the application itself. The following applications were used in the test. 
 iBooks application used to store .pdf file. 
 Pages application used to store .docx file. 
 Library used to store .mov file. 
 Library used to store .jpg. 
 Box application used to store .mp3 file. 
 
Box created a folder on user’s partition when application was installed.  Files from 
data set were recovered from /Library/Caches/TempFiles folder and include: 
 Viewed .doc file and viewed and saved for offline access .docx. 
 Viewed, viewed and saved for offline access .jpg files. 
 Viewed, viewed and stored for offline access .pdf files. 
 Viewed (played) and stored for offline access .mov file. 
This file was saved in Apple iMovie application. However, it could not be 
found in /iMovie directory. 
 
Music file saved for offline access was stored in /Documents/SavedFiles folder. 
 
A number of thumbnail images were found in /Library/Caches/Thumbnails of Box 
folder application. They were: 
 All .jpg files. 
 All .mov files.  
 One .pdf file (pdf icon). 
 Two .docx files (word icons). 
 One .mp3 file (icon only). 
 
All files names were different form the ones originally uploaded. File names were all 
numbers i.e. 12266512488.mp3. 
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Further analysis of xml property list file net.box.BoxNet.plist located in 
/Library/Preferences folder did not bring interesting findings which are presented in 
Appendix B. 
 
Analysis of SQLite file BoxCoreDataStore.sqlite located in /Documents folder brought 
findings. There was data stored in the table ZBOXBASECOREDATA that revealed as 
follows: 
 Original file names. 
 Box uniquely assigned file names i.e. 12266512488. 
 File type. 
 URLs to thumbnails images and preview files. 
 Masterkey. 
 File size. 
 Local URL string which was Box unique file name and file type i.e. 
12266512488.mp3 
 Streaming URL. 
 SHA-1. 
 
All that information enabled a researcher to make follow up test described in paragraph 
6.4.3. 
 
6.4.1.3  SugarSync 
 
Data set files saved for offline access were stored within different applications due to 
design of the application itself. The following applications were used in the test. 
 iBooks application used to store .pdf file. 
 Pages application used to store .docx file. 
 iMovie application used to store .mov file. 
 Library used to store .jpg file. 
 iMovie application used to store .mp3 file. 
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SugarSync created folder on user’s partition when application was installed.  Files 
from data set were recovered from the following folders in /tmp directory: 
 /cache 
o Viewed (played), viewed and removed and viewed and stored for offline 
access .mp3 files. 
 /http_cache 
o Viewed, viewed and removed and viewed and stored for offline access 
.doc and .docx files. 
o All .jpg files. 
o Viewed, viewed and removed and viewed and stored for offline access 
.pdf files. 
o Thumbnails image of a viewed (played) and stored for offline access 
.mp3 file. 
o Thumbnails images of viewed (played), viewed and removed and 
viewed and stored for offline access .mov files. 
 /links 
o Viewed (played) and stored for offline access .mov file. 
 
Analysis of SugarSync xml property file com.sharpcast.sugarsync.plist stored in 
/Library/Preferences revealed user email address for the account which is presented in 
Appendix C. 
 
Analysis of SQLite metadata repository file Rigno.sqlite stored in /Documents folder 
didn’t reveal any useful information. 
 
6.4.2  iOS Test  Outcomes  
 
All tested cloud based storage applications provide the same services with some 
differences to what files can be stored within the application storage or with other 
applicatsion like iBooks for .pdf files, Pages for Word documents, iPhone’s library for 
music and picture files or iMovie for video clips. Due to these differences Dropbox, 
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Box and SugarSync execute operations using their own mechanism.  Table 6.4 
provides holistic view of recovered files from iPhone device. 
 
Analysis of simulation of various states of the device brought following results. 
 For all cloud storage applications whether device remained powered on 
(RPO) or was powered off (PO), the same data set was recovered in both 
states.  
o From Dropbox folder the least number of files was retrieved and they 
were all files saved for offline access and .doc and .pdf files viewed 
only as expected. 
o From Box folder all files that were saved for online access were 
retrieved as well as .doc, .jpg and .pdf files viewed only as expected. 
o From SugarSync folders all Word documents were retrieved bar the 
one that was not accessed. All .jpg. and .pdf files were recovered. 
Music files found were these that were played, played and removed 
and played and stored for offline access.  The exception here was 
played .mp3 which has been removed from cache after the device 
was powered off. The expectation was to recover files that were 
viewed and viewed and saved for offline access.. 
 For all cloud storage applications whether the device had cache cleared 
(CC) or cache cleared and was powered off (CC-PO) the outcome was 
similar. 
o For Dropbox no files were recovered as expected. 
o For Box only .mp3 file as it was stored within the application as 
expected. 
o For SugarSync clearing cache had no effect. The same data set was 
retrieved as listed above. This means that application did not execute 
clearing the cache accurately. This was not expected. 
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 Dropbox Box SugarSync 
File RPO PO CC CC-
PO 
RPO PO CC CC-
PO 
RPO PO CC CC-
PO 
01.doc             
02.docx             
03.docx             
04.docx             
05.jpg             
06.jpg             
07.jpg             
08.jpg             
09.pdf             
10.pdf             
11.pdf             
12.pdf             
13.mp3             
14.mp3             
15.mp3             
16.mp3             
17.mov             
18.mov             
19.mov             
20.mov             
Table 6.5 Results of file recovery for iPhone device 
RPO = Remained powered on, PO = Powered off, CC = Cleared cache, CC-PO = Cleared 
Cache and powered off 
 
6.4.3  Box follow up tests  on iPhone  
 
Upon discovery of data not expected further analysis was undertaken. The focus of the 
researcher was the URL that used on any PC allowed downloading of a file. Any of the 
URL tested gave positive result.  URLs listed in SQLite table were for files that were 
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not removed from cloud storage provider servers. Below is the example of one if the 
URLs: 
https://mobile-
api.box.com/api/1.0/download/fs39y40jon6tl94czuyeeegsargxpzv1/12266285894?devi
ce_id=2541F721-BEC9-4FD5-BA37-02231479C506&device_name=Test%20iPhone 
 
Further investigation resulted in the following pattern in the URL. 
https://mobile-api.box.com/api/1.0/download/fs39y40jon6tl94czuyeeegsargxpzv1/ 
12266285894 
?device_id=2541F721-BEC9-4FD5-BA37-02231479C506 
&device_name=Test%20iPhone 
 
URL from another test case was:  
https://mobile-
api.box.com/api/1.0/download/1aexr8i10ozx54anfyn40duy7yu0372f/12266285894?de
vice_id=F3825526-F756-4102-A985-E3E6D618CD64&device_name=Test%20iPhone 
 
Also another iPhone handset was used to with Box application and the result of 
forensic investigation brought out the following URL. 
https://mobile-
api.box.com/api/1.0/download/xfeny61eeytrizwm3bfc4o8bmkuqj04m/12266285894?d
evice_id=5C583178-A0F0-4D8D-BA78-
3F7E07595647&device_name=Rad%27s%20iPhone 
 
Examination of these URLs sought for a further decoupling of the URL and an attempt 
to name and source individual parts of the URL. 
 Download part https://mobile-api.box.com/api/1.0/download/ 
 Some sort of token allocated to each instance of the application even if this 
application was installed on the same device or device was restored from 
the back. Each time that string had a different value. However, it always 
had the same number of alphanumeric characters, 32. Since this part of the 
URL changed with each new instance of the application installation it 
seems that it is generated when client connects to the server to download a 
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file. There was no URL for files that were removed from Box servers thus 
there was no need for this information on the client side. 
o xfeny61eeytrizwm3bfc4o8bmkuqj04m. 
o 1aexr8i10ozx54anfyn40duy7yu0372f. 
o fs39y40jon6tl94czuyeeegsargxpzv1. 
 File number which was actually the filename that is stored on Box servers. 
A study of all file numbers, and further tests within shorter or longer time 
intervals suggest that these number are generated whenever a Box user is 
uploading a file to a server. Once user uploads his or her files they get a 
bigger number in some sort of a sequence. It takes longer for bigger files to 
upload but this is not a factor in the numbering strategy that was 
investigated. The smallest file number that a file received was 
12266285894 and the biggest was 12407061476. Further file uploads 
resulted in file numbers getting value of 14449398854 and later 
14914355710.  
 Device ID, similarly to token above is generated each time the application 
was installed or device was restored from the back up. 
o ?device_id=5C583178-A0F0-4D8D-BA78-3F7E07595647. 
o ?device_id=F3825526-F756-4102-A985-E3E6D618CD64. 
o ?device_id=2541F721-BEC9-4FD5-BA37-02231479C506. 
Study of another xml property file com.apple.lsdidentifiers.plist on user 
partition in folder /Isd folder showed that device ID is generated at each 
instance of Box application installation. The below is the string extracted 
from plist file. 
LSVendorIdentifier^LSApplications_$2541F721-BEC9-4FD5-BA37-
02231479C506¡^net.box.BoxNetÒ 
 Device name was a device name given to the device by the researcher. 
 
These findings lead to development of a simple script to see if user’s data in the cloud 
could be compromised. The script was means to an automated download of all data 
stored by the user in the cloud during the script execution. The code depicted in figure 
6.1 was written in .NET Framework and executed in Powershell Integrated Scripting 
Environment. The code split the URL between download part/token and device 
ID&device name. The integer was a file number, the lowest taken from SQLite table 
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and was incremented by 1 and attempted to download file and save it in chosen 
location. This exercise proved to be successful. The limitation was that files were 
saved in none-file type format as seen in Appendix D. This would add complexity for a 
malicious individual but another script could be developed to test a file against known 
file types or use file headers to ease this process. Another finding which was not 
unexpected was each of URLs created in SQLite file whether the device was wiped, 
restored from the backup or created in SQLite database on another iPhone worked. 
Another test was run to see if new files added to cloud storage can be downloaded 
executing script against URL that was not used by any device i.e. after device was 
wiped and a new instance of Box application was installed. This proved to be 
successful again. The reason for this is that one user may have two different devices 
i.e. business phone and private phone. This indicates that the URL is generated on the 
server side and remains there forever. Servers obtain device details initially (device ID 
and device name) and create a token for the URL. Files are saved during uploading to a 
server in a sequence and remain on the server in that format until they are removed. 
This concludes that once an individual obtains access without owner being aware of it 
they can access and download data from user’s account. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Script to download files from Box cloud storage  
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the approach to test cases scenarios, use of forensic tools, and 
analysis of acquired data and outcomes of the research. Data stored in the cloud 
synchronised with the device is well handled within Dropbox and Box applications and 
bar the fact that it is poorly handled within SugarSync application. The real problem 
was in underlying data for application to work efficiently and seamlessly for the users’ 
advantage in Box application. As described in Box follow up tests there is a major 
security vulnerability that may affect one user that is targeted. However, this research 
leads to conclusion that there is a potential to infiltrate the whole data storage of all 
Box users. Malicious individual with an access to powerful machines and excellent 
scripting skills could develop a sophisticated script. This script could decouple the 
URL obtained from data acquired and execute the code that would generate tokens as 
well as device ID details and utilise dictionary tables for device names. This 
potentially may bring results in gaining access to data stored on Box servers for all 
users. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Smart phone devices using cloud storage applications should be trusted by the client. 
The ability to upload, download and share content on-the-go virtually anywhere poses 
a risk to users. Smart phones became inseparable devices in users’ lives to a great 
extent. Safeguarding of them and securing data stored on them is an unnoticed and not 
addressed concern to many. 
 
The purpose of this project was to uncover any potential security vulnerabilities when 
using cloud storage application on a mobile device. Upon findings of security flaws an 
attempt to exploit was the secondary goal of this research. 
  
7.2 Research Definition & Research Overview 
 
This research carried out an investigation of consequences of cloud storage mobile 
applications quality and reliability in the context of proliferation of smart phone 
devices and cloud storage services. Acquired data was subjected to thorough analysis 
of artefacts that cloud storage applications may have created on smart phone devices. 
At the commencement of the project the following research objectives were identified. 
 Uncover any potential security flaws when using cloud storage applications 
on a mobile device. 
 Extraction of data using forensic software. 
 Detailed analysis of cloud storage files structure and hierarchy. 
 Preparation of data set consisting of a number files that will be uploaded to 
cloud storage. 
 Simulation of real life transaction of data stored in the cloud. 
 Development of number of test cases to simulate real life scenarios. 
 Detailed review of the forensic software tools. 
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 Install of the forensic software products and familiarisation with them. 
 Thorough literature review. 
 Recommendation of a solution to avoid any security flaws. 
 
7.3 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
 
This project contributes to the body of knowledge related to security cloud storage 
applications on smart phone devices. Qualitative primary research being forensic 
acquisition of data off smart phone devices brings interesting findings. Dropbox and 
Box providers of cloud storage services stored files on the device in a secure manner 
while SugarSync was not proficient in providing the same level of security.  
 
A second contribution proposed by this project is discovery of a security vulnerability 
of Box mobile cloud application that may lead to user’s data being compromised. 
Unsecure storage of metadata should be addressed by the developers as it may lead to 
data leakage of all Box cloud storage users.  
 
7.4 Experimentation, Evaluation and Limitation  
 
This results of primary research at first glance indicated that mobile applications for 
two cloud storage vendors handled users’ data on the devices as per best practises. 
Files that users download for offline access for Dropbox and Box are only files stored 
locally on users’ devices when cache is cleared. SugarSync does not meet the 
expectations since regardless of the cache being cleared or not, application stores 
almost all data that users’ access. This does not depend if files are viewed only or 
viewed and removed, they can be found in SugarSync folders.   
 
Examination of findings that lead to secondary research for seemingly secure data 
handler that Box mobile application was considered uncovered major security flaw as 
discussed in Chapter 6. This research concludes as follows. The mobile device should 
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not store any information locally which will enable access to online content from 
unauthorised and unauthenticated user. The findings have shown that in certain 
circumstances a non-complex target address is stored locally which can be extracted 
using forensic tools. The address obtained can be used to gain access all files stored in 
user’s cloud storage as well as files that the unaware user will upload in the future. 
To avoid this situation recommendations are as follows. 
 The target address should not be stored locally. 
 The address should only be generated when the file is requested or 
uploaded. In this case the address should be removed afterwards. 
 Alternatively, the target address could be encrypted if it required locally. 
Downside of this solution is increased computational overhead of 
encrypting data on the device. Also this method cannot utilise encryption 
techniques completely without affecting performance of the device. 
 The target address should be non-trivial. 
 Provider’s servers have much more computational power and could 
generate more complex file structures, eliminate trivial target addresses or 
utilise cryptographic methods to their best. 
 Any target addresses generated should always require authentication access 
to the stored data. 
 
For end users the ultimate recommendation is not to use Box cloud storage services or 
if they wish to use it implement extra security measures.  
 Users should keep their devices with them at all times. 
 Set up password protection and keep their mobile devices locked when 
away from them. 
 Use applications that work as containers for other applications which 
enforce additional layer of encryption. Example here can be a Boxcryptor.  
 
7.5 Future Work & Research 
 
The recommendation for future work is to investigate further and build on this 
research. Throughout this study, it was proved the use of cloud storage services on 
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mobile devices is insecure. The lack of proper controls of application data handling 
may result in cloud storage vendor data being compromised. Also a lot of data artefacts 
including details like Masterkeys or SHA-1 keys were uncovered during analysis of 
SQLite files acquired from Box application that should be further investigated. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Smart phone security should be essential to any smart phone user. The security of 
smart phones in many cases relies on the way users handle their mobile devices 
themselves. Current environment and shift to cloud computing allowing users to store 
data within cloud storage and access it whenever they wish prompts for protection of 
the devices those users utilise for access to that data. Firstly more effort should put in 
choice based on research on security of the cloud storage vendors and the applications 
they provide. Additional security measures can be put in place by means of additional 
applications or utilisation of built-in extra encryption in the applications themselves if 
offered. However, there is not much more users themselves can do. Major 
responsibility lies with cloud storage vendors, their network architecture and security, 
and the expertise and the experience of application developers. 
 
This study sought to discuss the concerns in the area of mobile cloud computing, 
research the subject of smart phones and mobile applications security with use of 
forensic tools. Subsequently analyse data and artefacts stored on the mobile devices to 
uncover any security vulnerabilities and make recommendations for future research. 
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